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Chapter 2
Adding Adequacy to Equity: The Evolving Legal Theory of School Finance Reform
Richard Briffault

The law of school finance reform is conventionally described as consisting of three
“waves,” each associated with a distinctive legal theory.1 In the first wave, which began in the
late 1960s, plaintiffs relied on the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution to
challenge the disparities in per pupil expenditures among school districts within a state
attributable to the state’s reliance on the local property tax to fund elementary and secondary
education. This wave ebbed abruptly in 1973 when the United States Supreme Court rejected
the federal equal protection theory in San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez.2
It was, however, immediately followed by a second wave, in which plaintiffs continued to
focus on the interdistrict spending inequities resulting from the property-taxed based system
of school funding but grounded their legal attack on the equal protection provisions of state
constitutions. Plaintiffs won a number of notable state cases on this theory in the 1970s and
1980s. By the mid-1980s, however, this wave, too, receded, as more state courts rebuffed
equal protection challenges.
The third wave arose in 1989 with decisions by the state supreme courts of Kentucky,
Montana, and Texas that assertedly shifted the basis of litigation and adjudication from state
equal protection clauses to the state constitutional provisions directing state governments to
provide public elementary and secondary education, and the theory of reform shifted from
equity to adequacy. Under the adequacy theory, the constitutional violation is not that school
districts depend on drastically unequal property tax bases or that per pupil expenditures vary
across districts largely according to local wealth, but that the state government has failed to
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assure that all public school children in the state are receiving an adequate education.
Concomitantly, the appropriate remedy shifts from equalizing tax bases or per pupil spending
to assuring that an adequate education is provided to all schoolchildren. The shift from equity
to adequacy has been credited with the greater success school finance reform plaintiffs have
enjoyed in the last fifteen years.

The Limits of the Wave Theory of School Finance Reform
This “wave” metaphor and especially the attendant differences between the second
and third waves have been sharply overstated – temporally, textually, in terms of litigation
success, and as a matter of legal theory. Temporally, some pre-1989 cases also addressed the
financing question in adequacy terms and, more broadly, raised the question of whether state
governments were doing enough to discharge their state constitutional education mandates.
Indeed, in the late 1970s and early 1980s courts in Washington3 and West Virginia4 awarded
victories to plaintiffs on what we would call adequacy grounds. By the same token, even after
1989 school finance litigants have continued to bring equity cases, and during the 1990s
courts in several states – including Tennessee,5 Wyoming,6 Vermont,7 and New Hampshire8–
awarded victories to litigants on what are best recognized as equity grounds. Indeed, even in
the annus mirabilis of 1989 at least two of the plaintiffs’ victories – in Montana and Texas –
are at least as much about equity as adequacy.9
Textually, many of the pre-1989 equity decisions relied to a significant degree on state
education articles. The presence of constitutional provisions requiring state legislatures to
create and maintain public school systems enabled some state supreme courts to find that
education is a fundamental interest for state equal protection purposes, thus leading to the
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application of strict judicial scrutiny to interdistrict funding disparities. Indeed, this is
precisely what occurred in the decision that ushered in the “second wave,” Robinson v.
Cahill.10 Handed down by the New Jersey Supreme Court just days after the United States
Supreme Court’s Rodriguez decision, Robinson was textually grounded in the New Jersey
Constitution’s “thorough and efficient” education clause11 but embraced an equity theory.12
Conversely, many recent adequacy cases rely on state constitutional education
provisions that explicitly incorporate equity concerns. Very few state constitutions explicitly
use the term “adequate” education13 – and the supreme courts of two of those states (Florida
and Georgia) rejected school finance reform claims predicated on adequacy theories.14
Typically, the state constitutional text creating the duty to provide public schools refers to a
“thorough and efficient” or “general and uniform” educational system. A number of courts
that have focused on the education articles have found an egalitarian principle, rather than or
in addition to adequacy, implicit in the “thorough” or “uniform”15 requirements. Indeed, some
constitutional texts appear to fuse the adequacy and equity concepts, as in the Montana
provision that announces “it is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which
will develop the full educational potential of each person. Equality of educational opportunity
is guaranteed to each person of the state.”16
With respect to litigation success, although the emergence of the adequacy theory was
accompanied by a number of significant plaintiff victories, adequacy has by no means been a
panacea for school finance reform. Since 1989, state supreme courts have rejected adequacy
challenges to school finance systems in Florida,17 Illinois,18 Minnesota,19 North Dakota,20
Oregon,21 Pennsylvania,22 Rhode Island,
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Virginia,24 and Wisconsin.25 Even where

inadequacy has been found, courts have been uncertain as to just how far they can push their
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state legislatures in adopting a remedy, as indicated by recent decisions by the Alabama and
Ohio supreme courts terminating judicial proceedings and leaving the matter of remedies
entirely to the legislature.26
The Blurring of Adequacy and Equity
More importantly for understanding the relationship between adequacy and equity in
legal theory, courts have repeatedly recognized the interconnections of adequacy and equality,
even as they have also struggled to maintain some degree of separation between the two
ideas.27 In many cases, judicial analysis of adequacy is heavily suffused with equity concerns.
A judicial determination of educational inadequacy in a particular school district is almost
always predicated on some finding of inequity. Typically, the court will compare the
education provided in the plaintiff district or districts – measured either in terms of inputs like
class size, teacher qualifications, curricular scope, physical plant, or quality of textbooks and
other educational materials, or in terms of educational outputs like performance on
standardized tests, graduation and dropout rates and need for remedial education – with the
quality of the education provided in other, usually more affluent, districts.28 Significant
inequalities are treated as powerful evidence of inadequacy.
Moreover, although one of the basic distinctions, in theory, between adequacy and
equity is that adequacy permits some districts to spend above an adequate level, while equity
might insist on eliminating inter-district differences, some adequacy courts have also been
concerned about the gap between low and high spenders. The Montana Supreme Court, for
example, assumed that “the wealthier school districts are not funding frills or unnecessary
education expenses.”29 Others have noted that when a significant number of districts spend
above the adequacy level, the resulting inequality can lead to a redefinition of what is needed
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to achieve adequacy as “today’s supplementation tomorrow become[s] necessary to satisfy the
constitutional mandate” of what is needed to provide an adequate education.30
Not only is proof of inadequacy often grounded on evidence of inequality, but the
judicial definition of adequacy often incorporates equality concerns. Several state supreme
courts have emphasized that a central purpose of the state constitution’s education mandate
education is to enable children upon graduation to compete successfully with other
graduates.31 Competitiveness looms large in the most widely-noted judicial definition of an
adequate education – the seven capacities identified by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose
v. Council for Better Education.32 Specifically, the court required that in order to satisfy its
state constitution, the state legislature must create an education system that gives every child
“sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete
favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics, or in the job market.”33
The New Jersey Supreme Court in the Abbott litigation repeatedly emphasized that an
adequate education must enable disadvantaged children to compete against children who hail
from affluent suburban districts.34 Adequacy defined in terms of competitiveness necessarily
has a comparative and egalitarian component. In order to vie with their future competitors in
higher education or the labor market, the plaintiff students will need an education that is at
least as good as the ones their competitors receive. In other words, an adequate-as-competitive
education must be (at least) an equal one.
Courts frequently blur adequacy and equity concerns, so that it may be difficult to
determine whether a case is premised on equity or adequacy, let alone what either equity or
adequacy means. This can occur as a court’s analysis unfolds over a succession of cases, or
can even be seen as the court grapples with the school finance problem in a single case.
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A nice example of how a court’s school finance theory can morph over time comes
from the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decisions in the Claremont litigation. In
Claremont I, decided in 1993, the New Hampshire court determined that the state
constitution’s education clause – which makes it “the duty of the legislators and magistrates . .
. to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools” –
provided a constitutional basis for an attack by five property-poor districts on the state’s local
property-tax-based school finance system. The court determined that the constitution imposed
on the state a duty “to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child . .
. and to guarantee adequate funding.”35 However, the court gestured at an egalitarian theory of
what adequacy requires when it indicated that an adequate education is one that prepares
“citizens for their role as participants and as potential competitors” in the marketplace.36
When Claremont returned to the court four years later – following a remand to the
lower court, a lower court trial, and an appeal – the court shifted gears and determined that the
state education system was unconstitutional because it violated the state constitutional
requirement that taxes be “proportional and reasonable.”37 With different local districts taxing
at different rates, reflecting, in significant part, disparate local property tax bases, the school
finance system violated the constitutional tax uniformity requirement – a kind of equality
theory, albeit one that emphasized the equal treatment of taxpayers, not the equal treatment of
students. The next three New Hampshire Supreme Court school finance decisions over the
next three years all dealt with the tax uniformity provision and considered whether various
state legislative reforms of the school tax system satisfied the requirements of taxpayer
equity.38 To be sure, the taxpayer equity decisions were linked to the education article and the
adequacy requirement. The court required the property tax for education had to be uniform
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statewide, rather than within a district, because the state constitution’s education article makes
an adequate education a state responsibility, so the property tax for education must be treated
as a state tax.39 Moreover, the court reiterated the need for the state to fund education at a
level sufficient to achieve adequacy. Even in discussing funding rather than taxing, the court
combined adequacy and equity concepts, reiterating its earlier concern that an adequate
education be one that enables students to compete,40 and that “comparable funding must be
assured in order that every school district will have the funds necessary to provide such
education.”41 Finally, in 2002, the Claremont court added a new concept to the mix when it
held that the state’s “duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education includes
accountability,”42 that is, measures designed to assure that even adequately funded local
districts actually provide an adequate education. Thus, over the course of a decade of
doctrinal shape-shifting, the court fused notions of adequacy, taxpayer equity, spending
equity, and accountability into its evolving approach to public education.43
A striking instance of the simultaneous separation and blurring of adequacy and equity
concerns in a single case is the 1994 decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in Roosevelt
Elementary School District. No. 66 v. Bishop,44 which challenged the state’s reliance on local
school taxes to fund capital facilities, although the court expanded its analysis to include the
entire educational financing scheme.45 The court focused its analysis on the state’s education
article – which contains a “general and uniform” clause -- at least in part to avoid reopening
an earlier, second wave decision46 in which it rejected a state equal protection challenge to the
school financing system. The court repeatedly sought to separate adequacy and equity, noting
they present separate issues,47 and yet it repeatedly combined the two. Thus, the court
observed that the constitution does not require that all school districts offer a program that is
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“exactly the same, identical, or equal. Funding mechanisms that provide sufficient funds to
educate children on substantially equal terms tend to satisfy the general and uniform
requirement.”48 It went on to find that the education article “does not require perfect equality
and identity”49 and does not limit the ability of more affluent districts to devote more
resources to their schools. Indeed, the court stressed that “it is . . . not the existence of
disparities between or among districts that result in a constitutional violation.” But the court
also said that the “critical issue is whether those disparities are the result of the financing
scheme the state chooses” and described the state’s financing system as characterized by
“heavy reliance on local property taxation, arbitrary school district boundaries, and only
partial attempts at equalization”50 – supporting the inference that, indeed, unequalized
disparities violate the “general and uniform” requirement. It is difficult to tell from the
Arizona court’s opinion whether it was relying on adequacy, equity, or some hybrid of the
two. 51

Three Versions of the Adequacy-Equity Relationship
Although courts have often blended adequacy and equity concerns, in many cases,
adequacy does add something new to the legal analysis. Some courts treat state equal
protection and state education article claims as involving distinct legal arguments and they
analyze them separately. Moreover, a significant number of courts have reached different
results on equality and adequacy theories. Courts in Arizona,52 Idaho,53 Kansas,54 New
Jersey,55 New York,56 and Ohio57 rejected equality challenges to school financing systems but
found for the plaintiffs on an education clause-based adequacy theory. On the other hand,
many state supreme courts resolved adequacy and equality claims the same way: the
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Arkansas, Tennessee and Wyoming courts found for plaintiffs on both adequacy and equality
theories, while state supreme courts in another ten states rejected both adequacy and equity
claims.58 Nonetheless, although some state supreme courts found for plaintiffs on equal
protection grounds without considering an adequacy claim (or found for plaintiffs on an
adequacy theory without considering equality), there do not appear to be any courts that
combined the rejection of an adequacy attack with the validation of an equality challenge. In
other words, no court has found that a state was providing an education that is adequate but
also unconstitutionally unequal. The adequacy theory, thus, adds to the arsenal of plaintiffs’
legal weapons, although it is by no means certain of leading to a victory in court.
Although equity and adequacy are distinct legal theories, judicial approaches to
adequacy have clearly been shaped by equity concerns. This is true partly as a matter of
history, as earlier court decisions that focused primarily on equity informed later cases in
which adequacy took center stage. It is also, as previously suggested, a matter of theory, as
equity ideas have influenced judicial approaches to the meaning of adequacy. The finding
that a state is failing to provide an adequate education, however, can lead to different
remedies than a determination that a system is unequal. Affirmative decisions in equity cases
have, not surprisingly, sought to equalize tax bases or per pupil spending. Affirmative
decisions in adequacy cases, by contrast, have not focused on equity – although greater equity
in funding typically results – but in assuring an “adequate education” in all districts. That has
often proven to be a complex task, requiring judicial attention to the structure of the statelocal educational system and the content of the education provided, in addition to how that
education is financed.
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In a fifty-state legal system – with at least one state supreme court decision concerning
school financing reform in three-quarters of the states, and multiple decisions from several
states – it is difficult to find a consistent relationship between adequacy and equity in the law.
Judicial decisions in this area are often far from models of clarity, and doctrines within a state
can and do change over time. Very roughly, however, state judicial decisions concerning the
adequacy-equity relationship can be grouped into three categories – to be examined in the
following sections of this Chapter. These may be labeled: “inequity excused,” “equity minus,”
and “equity plus.”
In the first, adequacy and equity are separate concerns, but adequacy is invoked to
excuse or mitigate a court’s determination that an education system does not violate
constitutional equality norms. Adequacy is treated as a relatively minimal requirement, easily
satisfied by the state education system subject to challenge.
In the “equity minus” cases, the main significance of adequacy is to compel states to
devote more resources to the schools in their poorest districts, without requiring that the
poorest districts be made fully equal to the rich. In other words, adequacy operates to level up
the poor to some middle, acceptable level, but not to require that the poor be brought up to the
top – or that the top be brought down to a lower level of spending or achievement in the name
of equality.
In the “equity plus” decisions, courts have held that adequacy requires more than
equity. That “more” can be more resources, either for the state as a whole, or for the poorest
districts in the state, so that their hard-to-educate students can reach the same level of
educational attainment as students in more affluent areas. The “more” can also mean state
government activity beyond financing, such as greater state definition of the components of
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an adequate education, and the creation of a monitoring and oversight structure that assures
that students throughout the state in fact receive the state-defined adequate education. In these
cases, courts focus on educational outputs – such as student performance on tests designed to
measure academic achievement – as well as on inputs. There is still a strong egalitarian
component, as the purpose of these “equity plus” requirements is often to assure that the
children in the poorest areas actually receive the same education as more affluent children.
But some of these cases also indicate a state judicial intention to upgrade the state educational
system overall.

Adequacy as Inequality Excused (or Mitigated)
The origins of adequacy as an excuse for, or mitigation of, inequality can be seen in
the Supreme Court’s Rodriguez decision. In holding that interdistrict spending inequalities in
Texas, linked to disparities in local tax bases, did not violate the equal protection clause, the
Court noted that “no charge fairly could be made that the basic system fails to provide each
child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary”59 to constitute an
education. In other words, although the right to an adequate education was not strictly
speaking before the Court, Rodriguez did appear to take some comfort from the fact that even
though the Texas school system was marked by spending inequalities, the system at least
provided all school children with “basic minimal skills.”
The New York Court of Appeals took a similar approach to adequacy in its 1982
Levittown60 decision, although in Levittown, unlike Rodriguez, plaintiffs had stated a cause of
action under the state’s education article as well as its equal protection clause, so educational
adequacy theory was actually before the court. Having rejected plaintiffs’ equal protection
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claim, the court acknowledged that the education clause – which requires that the legislature
“provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools” – in theory
could support a constitutional challenge to the state’s school financing system, but then
rejected the claim on the merits by simply declaring that “a sound basic education” with
“minimally acceptable facilities and services” is being provided throughout New York.61 The
only evidence the court cited that a constitutionally adequate education was being provided
was the fact that compared with other states New York – which was the third highest of the
fifty states in expenditures per pupil – was devoting a significant amount of resources to
public schools.62 At about the same time, the Georgia Supreme Court in McDaniel v. Thomas
also took comfort in the presumed adequacy of the education its state was providing. The
Georgia court rejected an equity claim, took up an adequacy claim – the Georgia constitution
is the rare one that actually uses the term “adequate” in establishing the duty to provide
education63 – denied that adequacy included any egalitarian component,64 and then found,
based on the “massive” level of state support for education, that the adequacy requirement had
been satisfied.65 Courts in Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania
reached similar conclusions in the “second wave” era of the 1970s and 1980s.66
Even in the 1990s, courts in Maine, Minnesota, and Nebraska continued to mitigate
the sting of their rejection of equality challenges by asserting the adequacy of their school
systems, although in each case the court found that plaintiffs had failed to make out or support
an adequacy argument so that adequacy could be assumed.67 In another decision in the early
1990s, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that some districts were underfunded
relative to others but concluded that did not make the financing system “unsuitable” within
the meaning of the Kansas constitutional provision requiring “suitable provision for financing
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of the educational interest of the state.”68 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has been clearest in
linking a rejection of an equity claim to a presumption of adequacy in a case in which
adequacy was at least implicitly put at issue by plaintiffs’ invocation of the Wisconsin
education article. Moreover, the Wisconsin court’s approach to adequacy was strikingly
limited.

It held that adequacy requires no more than that the state offer students the

“opportunity to be proficient” in core subjects; “adequacy” does not require that students
attain proficiency: “This means that poor student performance on proficiency tests in school
districts is not, without much more, an indicia of the unconstitutionality [on adequacy
grounds] of the state school finance system.”69
Three factors seem to characterize this first set of adequacy cases. First, as exemplified
by the Wisconsin decision, they typically adopt a fairly limited definition of what constitutes
an adequate education. Courts may refer to “minimally acceptable facilities and services” or a
“basic adequate education,”70 rather than the high quality version of adequacy that has
become more common in recent cases. Second, they may restrict the scope of the
constitutional adequacy requirement. In a number of the states where the education article
refers to a “uniform” education, these courts have found that uniformity does not require
equal spending but rather concerns only matters like the length of the school year, or the
content of the curriculum.71 Third, these cases rarely involve a full judicial investigation of
the adequacy of the education actually offered. Adequacy is generally inferred from the
amount of state money devoted to education or the existence of state standards, or adequacy is
deemed to be conceded by the plaintiffs. It is in the last set of cases – where adequacy has not
even been at issue -- that it is clearest that the courts are turning to adequacy to excuse or
mitigate inequality rather than to consider what “adequacy” means. But in all these cases, it is
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implicit that adequacy has little to do with equity, and imposes no more than a modest burden
on the states, which the states can easily satisfy.
In these cases, of course, the adequacy argument failed – or wasn’t even tried.
Educational adequacy, while nominally required for state school systems, is not taken all that
seriously by the courts. However, this judicial minimization of the content and significance of
adequacy appears to be on the wane. Most of the adequacy-as-excuse cases predate the
contemporary dominance of the adequacy theory. The more recent judicial statements
occurred in disputes where plaintiffs did not even bring an adequacy claim. In most recent
cases in which constitutional inadequacy has been alleged, courts have either taken the issue
seriously and required a full-scale fact-finding or have rejected it on justiciability grounds,
that is, they have treated adequacy as a matter for the political process, not litigation. Still, in
taking the full measure of the impact of the adequacy theory on the school finance reform, it
is worth noting the significant set of cases in which adequacy had little impact at all, except
perhaps to excuse or mitigate the judicial acquiescence in an unequal school funding system.

Adequacy as “Equity Minus”
In the adequacy as “equity minus” cases, the thrust of the adequacy theory is to assure
greater parity in the funds available to and in the education supplied by local school districts
but not to require complete equalization across the board. This version of adequacy responds
to some of the practical and political shortcomings of equity as a legal theory of school
finance reform. As some scholars have suggested, state courts might have found it awkward
to use state equal protection provisions in school financing cases because that would involve
adopting an interpretation of equal protection sharply at variance with that of the Supreme
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Court in Rodriguez. While as a matter of legal doctrine, state judges are free to construe state
constitutional provisions differently from even identically-worded provisions of the federal
constitution, such a divergence might still seem arbitrary and subject a state court to criticism.
By relying on a state constitutional provision that has no federal counterpart, adequacy avoids
this problem.72
More significantly, the “equity minus” version of adequacy responds to one of the
flaws identified early on with the equity theory, which is that due to the drastic disparities in
local property wealth per pupil across districts – as demonstrated by the record of nearly every
school finance reform case – it is likely to be extremely costly for a state to assure all districts
the same resources the wealthiest districts enjoy. In theory, equality would require leveling all
districts up to the wealthiest district, or bringing down the expenditures of the wealthiest in
order to achieve equity at a lower level of spending. The former course of action is likely to
be prohibitively expensive, but the latter is a direct challenge both to the widespread practice
of decentralized school district decision-making and to the political power of the wealthiest
districts. Although some states have moved to cap local spending, courts may well be
reluctant to force such a dramatic and politically difficult action. Moreover, at a time when the
quality of the public schools seems increasingly uncertain, and many have stressed the need
for paying greater attention to achieving excellence in education, some judges have doubted
the wisdom of limiting spending on public education, even by affluent districts.73 Adequacy
as “equity minus” eliminates this problem by requiring an infusion of resources into less
affluent districts while treating higher levels of spending by more affluent districts as
acceptable. Courts that adhere to this view treat adequacy as a means for improving the
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quality of the education provided by the poorest school districts, and thus securing a greater
measure of equality, without requiring that the poor districts be made fully equal to the rich.
Probably the first state court to embrace adequacy as “equity minus” was the New
Jersey Supreme Court in the Robinson saga. In Robinson V, the New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld the Public School Education Act of 1975 – the state legislature’s response to earlier
court decisions holding that the state school financing system violated the “thorough and
efficient” education provision of the state constitution. The Act provided for a significant
increase in state support for education which would effectively equalize spending in roughly
two-thirds of the school districts of the state, and guarantee each district an effective tax base
somewhat higher than the statewide average per pupil tax base.74 Although that fell well short
of full equalization, the Act was such a significant improvement in equity that – combined
with other improvements in the state educational system, including greater state oversight of
local district performance – the state supreme court held that it satisfied the constitutional
requirement if it was fully funded.75
In Robinson the court’s treatment of adequacy as “equity minus” came late in the
litigation story as the court assessed the state’s response to its earlier mandates. In other states,
the judicial distinction between adequacy and equity, and the determination that adequacy
requires more money for poorer districts but not necessarily as much money as is available to
the more affluent, came earlier on as courts set out the criteria for determining whether state
school finance measures satisfy constitutional adequacy requirements.
Thus, in the first DeRolph decision in Ohio, the state’s supreme court, which had
previously rejected an equal protection challenge, held that plaintiff school districts had
proven that the current school finance system violated the state constitution’s “thorough and
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efficient” requirement because those districts “were starved for funds” and therefore lacked
teachers, buildings and equipment and were compelled to offer inferior educational programs
compared to those of other districts.76

Insufficient funding and the resulting unequal

educational offerings made out a case for inadequacy, but full equalization of funding or
programs would not be required: “We recognize that disparities between school districts will
always exist . . . We are not stating that a new financing system must provide equal
educational opportunity for all.”77 Indeed, the court insisted that state satisfaction of the
“thorough and efficient” requirement was consistent with both higher spending and more
expansive programs in more affluent districts.78 But the court insisted that all districts must
have enough money to offer an adequate educational program.
Similarly, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Abbeville County found that a claim
that education in forty less-wealthy school districts was underfunded and therefore inadequate
could go forward under the state constitution’s education article -- despite the court’s earlier
determination that interlocal school revenue disparities are not unconstitutional -- because a
requirement of adequacy would not mandate equity.79 And in the McDuffy decision, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court walked the line between adequacy and equity by
holding on the one hand that the state constitution’s education provision did not mandate
equal expenditures per pupil but that, on the other hand, “fiscal support, or the lack of it, has a
significant impact on the quality of education each child may receive.”80
Finally, in a decision handed down in 2005, the Kansas Supreme Court, which had
made adequacy -- that is, “suitable provision” for education in the words of the state
constitution – a judicially enforceable mandate only in 2003,81 again illustrated the idea of
adequacy as partial, but not full, equality. The court held that a state school finance law
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permitting “local option budgets” that enable districts to spend beyond the basic state
definition of an adequate education was consistent with the constitution since adequacy did
not require equality and instead permitted local “enhancements” above the adequacy level.
But it invalidated the law anyway because the state’s aid formula was too low, so local
districts remained too heavily dependent on property taxes to fund an adequate education and
“the result is wealth-based disparity.”82 In other words, suitability/adequacy required some
amelioration of wealth-based differences but was not offended by the ability of wealthier
districts to spend above the suitable/adequate level.
Adequacy as “equity minus” seems a pragmatic tempering of the potentially radical
thrust of a pure equity theory. In fact, it is not so clear that equity and adequacy as “equity
minus” are all that different in practice. Even in states in which courts embraced an equity
approach and invalidated the school finance system under the state equal protection clause,
courts were sometimes willing to accept legislative remedies that brought up the bottom and
leveled spending to the middle or upper-middle without fully equalizing spending or revenueraising capacity by all districts.
In Connecticut, for example, the state supreme court, which invalidated its state school
finance system on equal protection grounds, ultimately accepted a state legislative response
that significantly increased the state’s share of total education expenditures (although the
state’s share was still below the local share) and provided all districts with a “significant
equalizing state support” but also left “significant disparities in the funds that local
communities spend on basic public education.”83 As the reform measure created
“substantially equal educational opportunities,” the “remaining disparities do not undermine
the basic policy of equalizing state support for education.”84 Similarly, in Texas, the
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Edgewood saga began with the state supreme court determining that the “efficient system” of
education mandated by the state constitution requires all school districts to have “substantially
equal access to similar revenue per pupil at similar levels of tax effort”85 – in essence
adopting the fiscal neutrality version of equity found in the early school finance reform cases.
Six years later, the Texas court concluded that “an efficient system does not require equality
of access to revenue at all levels.”86 The court sustained a school financing scheme in which
most money for schools was still raised by local taxation and still allowed the wealthiest
school districts to raise and spend more money than their less affluent peers. As the court
subsequently observed, legislation that significantly reduced without eliminating wealth-based
disparities was constitutionally sufficient “only when viewed through the prism of history. In
other words, it was better than it had been.”87
Adequacy as “equity minus” may have emboldened some otherwise reluctant state
courts to enter the school finance reform arena, and may have also provided courts with a
principled rationale for making peace with their legislatures by accepting less-than-fully
equalizing finance reform measures. Adequacy as “equity minus” is more modest than full
equity, carries a less costly price tag, and makes space for a significant continuing local
financing role. It achieves the leveling up goal of equity for the poorest districts of a state
without threatening the school financing system as a whole. Yet, as noted, it may not be all
that different from equity in practice.
Relatively few state courts have embraced adequacy as “equity minus,” or, rather, few
have limited their understanding of adequacy to just leveling up the bottom. Most state courts
that adopted the adequacy theory either moved over time from “equity minus” to “equity
plus” or came to add aspects of “equity plus” to the limited equalization of “equity minus.”
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Despite its pragmatic appeal, “equity minus” appears increasingly to be giving way to
adequacy as “equity plus.”

Adequacy as “Equity Plus”
Probably the most significant development in school finance litigation has been the
rise of the theory of adequacy as “equity plus.” Although aspects of “equity plus” can be seen
as far back as the original New Jersey Robinson decision and West Virginia’s Pauley
decision, adequacy as “equity plus” only really emerged in 1989-90 with the Kentucky Rose
decision and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Abbott line of cases. Adequacy as “equity
plus” draws on three related strands of thinking that address some of the shortcomings of the
pure equity theory of school finance reform.
First, adequacy as “equity plus” has focused on the need for school financing systems
to provide more than equal funding to certain groups of school children, particularly the urban
poor, in order for those children to receive truly adequate educations. One problem with
equity as either tax base equalization or per pupil spending equalization – the two dominant
versions of equity in the case law of the first and second waves – is that neither fits well with
the needs of the urban poor. As the Supreme Court noted in Rodriguez, many urban areas are
not property-poor but, due to the presence of industrial and commercial property, are close to,
if not above, the average property wealth of the state. Moreover, due to the many competing
demands for urban services, many urban areas are often unable to devote as high a fraction of
their tax dollars to education as can suburban and rural districts. Many of these districts would
benefit little from tax base equalization.88 Further these districts often have high
concentrations of poor, harder to educate children, and so must incur considerably higher per
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pupil education costs. Although most courts that embraced the equity theory rejected the idea
that a strict equality of educational expenditures per child was constitutionally mandated and,
instead, agreed that higher needs and higher costs could justify greater state aid, equity theory
did not provide much affirmative support for such additional assistance.89 The adequacy as
“equity plus” theory, by contrast, provides a basis for arguing that if more state funds are
needed in some districts than in others in order to provide an adequate education then those
additional funds must be provided.90 This could also be described as adequacy as “vertical
equity,” in which differently situated children require different amounts of public school
dollars in light of their differing educational needs, in contrast to the traditional “horizontal
equity” approach which has sought to provide different school districts with relatively equal
dollars per child.91
The prime instance of adequacy as “equity plus” for the educationally needy is the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s second Abbott decision in 1990.92 In that case, the court
concluded that the children in the vast majority of the state’s school districts were receiving
the “thorough and efficient” education required by the state constitution but that a thorough
and efficient education was not being provided in twenty-eight poor urban districts “based
both on the absolute level of education in those districts and the comparison with the
education on affluent suburban districts.”93 Noting that due to social, economic, and
demographic factors the “educational needs of students in poorer, urban districts vastly
exceed those of others, especially those from richer districts,”94 the court held that the
educational offerings in what subsequently became known as the “special needs districts”
(“SNDs”) “must contain elements over and above those found in the affluent suburban
districts. . . . [I]n poor urban districts, something more must be added to the regular education
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in order to achieve the command of the Constitution.”95 The court specifically required that
educational expenditures per pupil in the SNDs must be equal to the average of the current
expense budget of the state’s top school districts, with the SNDs’ budgets rising as the
budgets of the top districts rise, and that “in addition, their special disadvantages must be
addressed.”96 Four years later, the court invalidated one state legislative response to its
holding because, although the law reduced the spending gap between the SNDs and the top
districts, some disparities remained. Moreover, the state failed to fund “special funds and
services targeted to the needs of those disadvantaged students.”97 Three years later the court
held unconstitutional the funding provisions of another state legislative response because once
again the state’s financial assistance to the SNDs was “incapable of providing the remediation
that will overcome that constitutional deprivation.”98 Ultimately, in order to provide the extra
support to which the SNDs were deemed constitutionally entitled under the “equity plus”
theory, the court ordered adoption of a special master’s report that called for the
implementation of “whole-school reform” for elementary schools, full-day kindergarten for 5year-olds, half-day pre-kindergarten for 3- and 4-year-olds, provision of health and social
services, additional security measures, and other special programs for the SNDs.99 In other
words, adequacy required not merely that the neediest districts receive funding equal to that of
the most affluent, but that they actually provide extra programs, and receive the funding
necessary to pay for them, in order to overcome the educational disadvantages children in
these districts face.
The North Carolina Supreme Court embraced a similar “equity plus” approach in its
2004 decision in Hoke County,100 when it held that its state constitution’s education
provisions were violated in the poor rural districts which had brought suit. Following the trial
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court, the state supreme court found that the “bulk of the core” of the state’s “educational
delivery system” was sound and passed constitutional muster, but that the state’s failure to
provide an effective mechanism to deal with the educational needs of “at-risk children” –
defined by a complex of social, economic, and demographic factors101 – meant that the state
was failing to secure the education guaranteed by the state constitution.102 The state was
directed to assess the special needs of at-risk children and to develop a plan to address them,
including the redeployment of state education aid. But the court drew back from the lower
court’s determination to mandate pre-kindergarten programs for at-risk four-year-olds, finding
that it unduly trenched on the authority of the executive and legislative branches.103
A second strand of adequacy as “equity plus” can be seen in the state court decisions
requiring their state governments to devote more money to education statewide, and not just
in the property-poorest districts. The prime exemplar of this version of adequacy as “equity
plus” is the Kentucky supreme court’s Rose decision. Although Rose discussed inequalities
within the Kentucky school system which meant that “students in property poor districts
receive inadequate and inferior educational opportunities as compared to those offered to
those students in the more affluent districts,”104 the court concluded that the level of support
for education in Kentucky was inadequate in all districts.105 The court found that Kentucky
overall was marked by low educational effort and low educational achievement – in per pupil
expenditures, teacher salaries, graduation rates, and scores on achievement tests. Rather than
just compare inputs and outputs across districts within the state, the court also compared
Kentucky against other states within the region and nationally in terms of the resources
devoted to education and the measures of educational attainment, and found that Kentucky
fell short. Adequacy required an increase in resources for education throughout the state.
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Other state courts, such as those in Alabama and Arkansas, have followed Kentucky’s
lead in assessing adequacy in terms of the state’s dedication of resources to education and the
performance of the state’s school districts compared to that of other states. Like Kentucky,
they found their school systems inadequate in an absolute sense – although that inadequacy
was evidenced by the comparison of these states to other states. In these states, adequacy
would require not just bringing up the poorest districts to some undefined middle, but
increasing the resources devoted to education in the state as a whole.106
This aspect of adequacy of “equity plus” also derives from some of the perceived
shortcomings of early equity cases. First, in the fiscal neutrality aspect of equity embraced by
the California Supreme Court in Serrano, the equity problem was often tax-base inequity.
Taxpayers in low-wealth districts paid higher tax rates but generated less revenue per pupil
than taxpayers in high-wealth districts. Power equalization could remedy this by assuring each
district an equivalent tax base and thus equal revenue for equal effort. But that did nothing to
assure that low-wealth districts would devote their equalization aid to education, as opposed
to cutting their tax rates. Second, and relatedly, even if equalization were achieved by a
general take-over of school funding, there did not assure improvement of the education
provided in the poorest districts. Although equalization often leads to an increase in per pupil
school spending, California provides evidence that equalization can be accomplished by
leveling down, as well as by leveling up.107 Adequacy defined as increasing the resources for
education in the course of reducing inequalities within a state is clearly about improving
education funding, not taxpayer equity, and it is unlikely to permit equality to be achieved at
lower levels of spending.
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Adequacy as “equity plus” also clearly reflects the growing public concern in the
1980s about the uncertain quality of public education. In the aftermath of the publication of A
Nation at Risk early in that decade, excellence (or its lack) replaced equity as the public’s “top
concern” about education.108 “Equity plus” unites equity and excellence into a court-ordered
call, rooted in the state constitution, for devoting greater resources to education.
Rose’s vision of adequacy as more than just equalizing spending within a state has not
been limited to court decisions based solely on an adequacy theory. In both the Alabama and
Arkansas decisions, the courts combined equal protection and education clauses, and equity
and adequacy reasoning, in finding that their state constitutions require the devotion of
additional funding to education. The Wyoming Supreme Court, relying on both equal
protection concepts and constitutional education provisions, found that the state constitution
requires both “financial parity” and sufficient funding statewide to provide all students with
the “best educational system.” In the Wyoming court’s view, equity involves not merely
equal slices of the funding pie: “the pie must be large enough to fund [educational] need”
statewide.”109 Similarly, the Montana supreme court, which, in 1989, had relied on the
“equality of educational opportunity” guarantee of the state constitution to invalidate a school
funding system marked by substantial inter-district disparities in per pupil spending, in 2005,
held that even though a legislative school financing reform had eliminated most inter-district
spending differences, the state’s education funding legislation failed the “basic system of free
quality public elementary and secondary schools” clause of the state constitution because the
state was not providing enough money overall.110
The third strand in “equity plus” goes beyond financing. These adequacy courts have
required their state governments to spell out the elements of a constitutionally adequate
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education, determine the inputs – including curriculum, staffing, facilities, and educational
materials – necessary to provide it, and more effectively oversee whether an adequate
education is being provided by local school districts. This may involve state measures for
assessing students’ academic attainments, greater state monitoring of local school district
performance, and state intervention when local districts fall short. This aspect of adequacy
dates back to the initial reliance on state education articles during the so-called second wave.
Both the New Jersey court in Robinson and the West Virginia court in Pauley v. Kelley called
on their states to define the “thorough and efficient education” their state constitutions
require, with attention to the necessary facilities, instructional materials, personnel,
performance standards, and administrative oversight.111 State definition of educational content
and greater state monitoring of and responsibility for local school district performance was
also central to the Kentucky court’s decision in Rose. In recent years, courts in Kansas, New
Hampshire, Ohio, and Texas have focused their interpretations of their states’ education
clauses on educational content definition, the monitoring of local performance, and state and
local accountability for performance short-falls.112 Indeed, as with the enhanced funding
aspect of “equity plus,” this increasing judicial attention to state satisfaction of contentdefinition and oversight requirements has not been limited to adequacy states. Courts in
Arkansas, Montana, Tennessee, and Wyoming have all looked to whether states have set
curricular requirements, adopted accountability standards, and put in place means of
measuring pupil performance in their analysis of school finance reform claims.113
In these cases, educational content issues are not separate from financing issues.
Rather, increasingly, courts are treating state specification of educational content and state
provision of adequate financing as closely connected. An important new development is the
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adequate education cost study. In just the years since the turn of the millennium state courts in
Arkansas, Kansas, Montana, New York, Ohio, Tennessee and Wyoming have required their
legislatures or state education departments to determine the components of an adequate
education, specify the inputs necessary to achieve adequacy, and then cost out those inputs in
order to determine the amount of funding that must be devoted to education, either statewide
or in the plaintiff school districts.114 Where states have failed to justify their funding decisions
in terms of such a cost-of-adequacy study, or a state legislature has departed from the cost-ofadequacy study’s conclusion when it enacted a state aid formula, the state supreme court may
be sharply critical and even invalidate the state financing measure.115 Moreover, as the list of
state courts that have looked to cost-of-adequacy studies in making their decisions indicates,
as with other aspects of adequacy as “equity plus,” the requirement that state funding
decisions be closely justified in terms of the funds needed to pay for an adequate education is
not limited to state courts that have premised their interventions on adequacy requirements.
Rather, such cost-justified decision-making is a theme in many recent school finance reform
cases.
The three strands of adequacy as “equity plus” clearly demonstrate equity concerns –
to make sure that poor districts get the funding that, in light of their special needs, they need
in order to be truly equal with more affluent districts; to bring up the funding of education in
states which have provided limited support for education to regional or national levels; and to
adopt administrative measures and cost studies that assure that funding is sufficient to truly
provide equal educational opportunities within a state. From this perspective adequacy as
“equity plus” reflects a maturation of the equity idea from simple inter-district tax-base or per
pupil spending equalization to a more sophisticated understanding of the additional resources,
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structural reforms, enhanced oversight, and cost-justified spending that may be necessary in
order to actually equalize educational opportunities. Indeed, this evolution of what equity
requires can also be seen in contemporary cases that rely on equity, or a combination of equity
and adequacy, rather than adequacy alone.
On the other hand, in many state courts adequacy as “equity plus” also goes beyond
even the most sophisticated definition of fiscal equity to encompass an overall assessment of
the state’s role in discharging the constitutional mandate to provide public education. It is
theory of education governance reform rather than of education finance reform. Indeed, as
noted, this version of adequacy incorporates into school finance reform the public concern
about improving school quality and educational outcomes that first became politically salient
in the 1980s and can also be seen in the No Child Left Behind law. Under adequacy as “equity
plus,” courts are requiring legislatures to do more than equalize school funding; they are
requiring the states to create stronger, more accountable educational systems.

Adequacy, Equity, and the Judicial Role in Education Finance Reform
Early in the “third wave” period some academic advocates of the adequacy approach
asserted, pragmatically, that adequacy is the better approach for reformers to take because
courts will see it as both more legitimate and less challenging to the political branches than
arguments from equity.116 Adequacy is arguably more legitimate because it builds on the
special state constitutional commitment to education, thus providing a judicial theory with
more constitutional purchase than the equality requirement which the United States Supreme
Court rejected in this very context. And adequacy is less challenging to the political branches
than arguments from equity since adequacy leaves some inequalities in place and, in
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particular, does not threaten the threaten the ability of politically powerful affluent districts to
spend more on their children. These arguments for an adequacy approach are best reflected in
the “equity minus” form of adequacy. For courts that define adequacy as “equity plus,”
however, the adequacy theory tends to extend courts to the limits of their institutional
competence and power by embroiling them in efforts to define “education,” to appraise the
sufficiency of state measures to oversee and finance local provision of such an education, and
to force state legislatures to give a greater priority to education than the legislators themselves
would prefer. With courts increasingly viewing adequacy as “equity plus,” the question of the
judicial role in defining and enforcing adequacy becomes more difficult.
Conceptually, the very notion of an “adequate” education is inherently fraught with
uncertainty. State constitutions say virtually nothing about what constitutes an adequate
education. By comparison with adequacy, equality is a relatively determinate idea. Equality
requires that all districts be treated alike. In theory, equity can be achieved without any
decision about what an education ought to achieve or how much money ought to be devoted
to education. Equity can work from existing levels of education spending to set the standard.
Adequacy, on the other hand, is totally free-floating and requires difficult and deeply
contestable determinations about the purposes of education, how that is to be achieved, and
what resources are necessary to do so. As opposed to equity, adequacy would appear to lack
“judicially manageable standards” and, thus, be a poor candidate for judicial enforcement.
Indeed, a number of state supreme courts – in Florida,117 Illinois,118 Pennsylvania,119
Rhode Island120 and Virginia121 – have taken this position. When school finance reform
plaintiffs have pressed arguments based on the education requirements of their state
constitutions, these courts determined not that their states satisfied the adequate education
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mandated but that the educational quality required by the constitution is a matter for the
political process, and not fit for judicial resolution. Most of these decisions were issued in the
mid- and late-1990s. Although it is not clear they were driven by the rise of the “equity plus”
idea, it is not surprising that some courts would be concerned about the scope of the judicial
role at a time when adequacy was increasingly turning into a vehicle for judicial oversight of
entire state school systems.
On the other hand, many state courts have determined that education article challenges
to school financing systems are justiciable, and these courts have found ways of making the
definition of an adequate education judicially manageable. Most commonly, this has involved
a combination of judicial articulation of some unexceptionable general principles of the
purpose of education coupled with a directive to the state legislature and/or state education
department to develop more specific standards, including the components of an adequate
education, and the educational inputs and performance measures necessary to assure an
adequate education is actually provided. The general criteria listed by the West Virginia court
in Pauley and the Kentucky court in Rose, have been repeatedly cited, sometimes with
modifications, by other state courts. State legislatures have typically acceded to such court
decisions by adopting laws that define educational requirements, and call for the monitoring
local school districts, and the testing student performance. The definition of a “general and
uniform” or “thorough and efficient” education, then, has been a surprisingly cooperative and
interactive process, with courts initially forcing the legislatures to take the necessary steps,
and then generally accepting the results.122
The greater difficulty for many adequacy courts, like equity courts, has been getting
state legislatures to fully fund the adequate education that the legislature has been willing to
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define and test. State supreme court orders requiring additional school funding to meet
adequacy requirements have frequently encountered legislative resistance, necessitating
multiple trips to the court house and numerous follow-up court decisions and orders. In states
like Arizona,123 Kansas,124 New Jersey,125 and Ohio,126 school financing and administrative
reforms have ping-ponged between the legislatures and the courts, as legislatures have
adopted measures in response to court declarations of unconstitutional inadequacy, and the
courts have found the state enactments wanting.
At least three state supreme courts – in Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Ohio – that
adopted “equity plus” requirements backed down and accepted state actions (and inactions)
that arguably fell short of both adequacy and equity.127 These courts decided to declare
victory, over the opposition of dissenters and in the face of evidence that the state reform
measures fell short of fully addressing the issues that triggered the initial finding of a state
constitutional violation. In the Massachusetts case, a plurality of the court found that the
state’s Education Reform Act provided a “long-term measurable, orderly and comprehensive
process of reform,”128 with greater state articulation of educational requirements, new
additional financial assistance to poorer schools, and significant performance and
accountability standards. To be sure, “significant shortcomings” also remained in the plaintiff
school districts but they did not constitute an “egregious” departure from the adequacy goal
previously articulated by the court. Moreover, the plurality emphasized the primacy of the
governor and legislature in “educational policy-making.”129
The Ohio Supreme Court was, if anything, even more candid in describing its action
as a compromise. After generally praising the latest legislative reform, the court indicated that
certain modifications would be necessary in order for the law to pass constitutional muster,
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and that adequacy would also depend on full funding, but held that it was willing to assume
the “good faith” of the legislature and terminated the case.130 The Arkansas court also praised
the “progress” the legislature had made in standardizing the curriculum, increasing state
oversight, and improving funding, and released jurisdiction of the case.131 Within a year,
however, both the Arkansas and Ohio supreme courts recanted, found that their legislatures
had not sufficiently funded their reform measures, and issued new orders requiring further
legislative action132 – although the Ohio court thereafter changed its mind again, declared an
end to further judicial involvement and announced that it was leaving the question of
remedies to the legislature.133
On the other hand, some state courts have been relatively successful at forcing
dramatic state-level legislative or administrative changes in the definition of education,
financing of school districts, and monitoring of school changes without protracted legislativejudicial conflicts. Kentucky and Vermont, for example, seem to be examples of fairly radical
court decisions followed by substantial compliance by the political branches. Moreover, it is
not clear that adequacy decisions create more difficulties for political implementation and
judicial enforcement than equality decisions. In the face of legislative noncompliance with its
orders, the Alabama Supreme Court declared that judicial involvement in school finance
reform was over, with plaintiffs directed “to seek further redress from the legislature not the
courts.”134 Yet the judicial invalidation of the school finance system in Alabama was based as
much on equality as on adequacy. More generally, “equity plus” concerns with governance,
monitoring, performance measures, and accountability have spread to courts relying on state
equal protection clauses, or on equal protection and education clauses together, rather than
just equality alone.135
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In practice, as in theory, then, there does not appear to be a significant difference
between equity and adequacy approaches to school finance reform. As plaintiffs combine
equal protection and education article claims, and as courts track developments in other
jurisdictions, equity ideas have come to play an important role in adequacy thinking much as
adequacy concerns about educational definition, governance, monitoring, and performance
have come to affect courts initially concerned primarily with the equalization of tax bases or
spending. So, too, even though adequacy claims and judicial adequacy holdings have become
more ambitious – folding in, inter alia, accountability mandates and requirements that states
justify education spending in terms of an expert-determined cost of an adequate education –
so that it is hard to argue that adequacy is a safer, less interventionist theory for courts than
equity, it is not clear that adequacy holdings have become less judicially enforceable, or, at
least, that they are less judicially enforceable than rulings premised on the equity theory. To
be sure, a significant number of courts have stressed justiciability concerns in declining to
enter the thicket of court-ordered school finance reform. But once courts have entered the
adequacy battle it does not seem that they are any less successful overall than courts that have
endorsed the equity theory.
As a matter of legal theory, the general blurring of adequacy and equity concerns
appears to have led those courts willing to engage with school finance reform to converge on
a common set of goals. These include: greater state definition of educational requirements;
state adoption of performance standards, state monitoring of and accountability for local
educational outcomes; requirements that states cost-out the price of an adequate education and
then assure provision of the necessary funds; partial equalization of financing, aimed more at
bringing up the bottom than holding down the top; and a special concern with the needs of
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educationally at-risk students or the poorest districts. The success of this judicial program is
uncertain, and results vary considerably across the states. But that is mostly a matter of
differences in state politics and in the judicial stomach for conflict with the political branches,
and not the legal theory – equity or adequacy -- on which judicial intervention is based.
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